We analyze the welfare e¤ect of governmental regulation for individuals who consider anticipated regret in their decision making process. While governmental policies by directing choice distort individual decisions in the private market they can alleviate individuals'pain associated with the feeling of regret. We specify a general model to highlight this trade-o¤ and investigate two policies more closely: tax deduction for non-insured losses and mandated investment guarantees in private retirement accounts. We derive conditions under which these policies are welfare increasing.
Introduction
Regulation of competitive markets is typically justi…ed by ine¢ ciencies arising from externalities or asymmetric information problems. A di¤erent line of reasoning argues that individuals make certain decisions that are not in their own best interests, e.g., caused by problems of self-control or incorrect beliefs. This gives rise to the role of the government as a paternalist. By correcting these decisions the government increases welfare for those individuals (see, e.g., Camerer forcing choices. 1 Camerer et al. (2003) propose asymmetric paternalism with large bene…ts for boundedly rational consumers and little costs to fully rational consumers, e.g., default rules that can easily be overruled. Glaeser (2006) , on the other hand, argues that consumers might face stronger incentives than governments do to correct those errors and that millions of consumers might be less prone to persuasion by private …rms than a few government bureaucrats. Sandroni and Squintani (2007) also urge to be cautious about the paternalistic rationale for governmental intervention. They show that the asymmetric information rationale for compulsory insurance might be eroded by the existence of individuals who have overcon…dent beliefs.
In this paper, we examine a di¤erent reason for governments to direct individuals' choiceeither directly by restricting the choice set or indirectly by providing incentives for speci…c choices.
Our rationale is built on the assumption that individuals'welfare depends on foregone alternative choices, i.e., choices that individuals decided not to choose but could have chosen. This dependence on foregone alternative choices arises from the feeling of regret or self-blame if some foregone alternative choice would have yielded a superior outcome. Governmental intervention in markets by means of directing choice might either change the set of foregone alternative decisions the individual could have chosen from freely and/or the wealth levels implied by foregone alternative decisions. This e¤ect can be bene…cial for individuals if they associate a cost to the feeling of regret or self-blame. Since they are either directly or indirectly forced by the government to certain decisions, individuals feel no regret or self-blame for those decisions because they were not available for choice to them. Directing individuals'choices in that way thus reduces the feeling of regret and thereby increases their welfare. 2 However, the partial imposition of or provision of incentives for certain decisions potentially implies a distortionary e¤ect of individuals' decisions in the private market and thereby reduces individual welfare.
In this paper, we examine this trade-o¤ of governmental intervention under individual preferences that take into account the feeling of regret and investigate two applications more closely:
income tax deduction of privately non-insured losses and mandated investment guarantees for private retirement accounts. In both settings, the governmental policy creates an incentive problem which reduces individual welfare. While the tax deduction system serves as partial insurance and thereby provides incentives to underinsure (see Kaplow, 1992) , mandated guarantees provide incentives to increase the exposure to investment risk (see Bodie and Merton, 1993; Smetters, 2002) .
On the other hand, these governmental policies reduce the wealth levels of foregone alternative decisions since individuals are forced to …nance the policies through taxes. This e¤ect reduces the feeling of regret and thereby increases welfare. We show that some degree of governmental intervention is bene…cial to individuals if their marginal utility of realized wealth is increasing in the foregone level of wealth that would have resulted from the foregone best alternative. This condition is consistent with regret preferences explaining observed violations of expected utility theory (Braun and Muermann, 2004; Gollier and Salanié, 2006; Laciana and Weber, 2008) and is supported by empirical evidence (Bleichrodt et al., 2010) .
There is much empirical evidence of both individuals experiencing regret and the anticipation of regret in ‡uencing individual decision making (see, e.g., Loomes, 1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Simonson, 1992; Larrick and Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996) . We refer to Zeelenberg (1999) who reviews the evidence from these and other studies in which regret is made salient to individuals at the time of choice and from studies in which the uncertainty resolution of alternative choices is manipulated.
More recently, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) compare two lotteries in the Netherlands, a regular state lottery and a postcode lottery in which the postcode is the ticket number. In the latter 2 We note that directing individuals' choice does not alleviate the feeling of disappointment. Regret arises from comparing the actual decision outcome with counterfactual outcomes in the same state of the world, but derived from foregone alternative decisions. Disappointment, instead, arises from comparing the actual outcome with counterfactual outcomes in di¤erent states of the world (Loomes, 1988 , Zeelenberg et al., 2000b . Since directing individuals' choice does not change the state space, such governmental interventions do not e¤ect the feeling of disappointment. lottery, individuals who decide not to play the lottery thus receive feedback about whether they would have won had they played the lottery. They conduct di¤erent studies which all con…rm that this feedback causes regret and changes the decision whether to play the lottery. satisfaction and emphasize the importance of perceived personal responsibility of choice. They con…rm the evidence that only subjects who feel personally responsible for their choice experienced both greater self-credit and self-blame than subjects on whom the choice was imposed. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) show that subjects facing a larger choice set reported that they are more dissastis…ed and have more regret about the choices they have made than subjects facing a more limited choice set. 3 These empirical …ndings support our reasoning in this paper that governmental regulation by taking on responsibility for certain decisions partially relieves individuals of that choice responsibility and thereby of subsequent potential regret. Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) propose various strategies for individuals to self-regulate their feeling of regret including transferring decision responsibility to others, e.g., to …nancial advisors or to other experts. Even though delegating a decision might reduce the feeling of regret for that decision, the delegation decision itself might induce regret. While this is not an issue in our context of governmental enforcement, such regulation can create distortionary e¤ects on individual decision making in the private market. This is the trade-o¤ we are exploring in this paper. Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) propose modi…ed forms of the utility function which incorporate regret. They show that anticipated regret can help explain empirically observed violations of expected utility theory, e.g., the Allais paradox, the common ratio e¤ect, or simultaneous gambling and insuring. Sugden (1993) and Quiggin (1994) We structure the paper as follows. In Section 2 we specify individuals'preferences taking into account the feeling of anticipatory regret and examine the trade-o¤ of governmental intervention in a general model. In Sections 3 and 4 we apply the general model to income tax deduction of non-insured losses and to mandated guarantees for private retirement accounts, respectively, and determine the condition under which governmental intervention raises individual welfare. We conclude in Section 5.
Preferences and General Setup
We assume that preferences are represented by the maximization of expected utility with respect to a two-attribute utility function U = U (W; W max ) which depends on the realized level of wealth, W , and the maximum level of wealth, W max , the individual could have achieved by the foregone best alternative in the realized state of nature. Ex post, the individual thus regrets that he did not make the decision that would have led to the wealth level W max . Ex ante, the individual anticipates his ex post feeling of regret which he takes into account in his decision making process.
Representing this anticipatory feeling of regret by the two-attribute utility function U = U (W; W max ) is justi…ed by the axiomatic foundation of Sugden (1993) and Quiggin (1994) and includes the functional form proposed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) . 4 We impose the usual assumptions that the utility function is twice continuously di¤erentiable in both attributes, increasing and concave in wealth, U 1 > 0 and U 11 < 0, and satis…es Inada's conditions Let wealth W = W (q; t;x) be a continuously di¤erentiable function of the individual's choice q 2 Q, the governmental policy t 2 T , and the state variablex. We assume that the choice set Q and the policy set T are compact subsets of the real line and that the state variable is a real-valued random variable. We consider the following sequence of events.
Time 0 The government sets the policy t.
Time 1 The individual chooses q.
Time 2 The state variable realizes and the individual consumes his wealth.
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction which implies the following optimization problems. 4 Sugden (1993) and Quiggin (1994) formulate axioms such that the representative value function depends only on the realized level of wealth and the maximum level of wealth the individual could have obtained in each realized state of the world. Bell (1982) suggests the following functional form U (W;
) for some Bernoulli utility function u and function g. 5 We use the notation Ui for the partial derivative of U with repsect to the i-th variable.
Time 2 For a given policy t and realized state of naturex = x, the corresponding foregone best alternative, q max (t; x), is given by
The implied maximum level of wealth the individual could have obtained is therefore W max = W (q max (t; x) ; t; x).
Time 1 Given the policy t, the individual chooses q to maximize his expected utility according to the utility function U = U (W; W max ). Since the individual has no in ‡uence on the choice of the governmental policy t, he only regrets towards his own decision q. 6 The optimal choice q is then
given by the solution of the following maximization problem
Time 0 The government sets the policy t to maximize individual welfare taking into account its in ‡uence on the individual's choice q at time 1. The optimal individual welfare in this setting is thus given by the following maximization problem W q 0 ; t; x for all x and t.
We point out that governmental intervention under these preferences causes multiple e¤ects on individual welfare.
First, it distorts the individual decision q which is resembled by the constraint (3). The distortionary e¤ect of governmental intervention arises from an incentive problem. For individuals who 6 We thus assume that the individual does not associate a cost to blaming the government in case the imposed policy t turns out to be suboptimal ex-post. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence showing that responsibility for choices is positively related to the subsequent feeling of regret (Zeelenberg et are not sensitive to the feeling of regret, i.e., for which U 2 = 0, this is the only e¤ect and it implies a reduction in individual welfare.
However, for individuals who do regret foregone alternative decision, i.e., for which U 2 < 0, there are additional e¤ects of governmental intervention on that feeling of regret. First, governmental intervention a¤ects the reference level of wealth towards which the individual regrets. More speci…cally, we have
for all t and x. This impact includes a direct e¤ect, W t (q max (t; x) ; t; x), and an indirect e¤ect through in ‡uencing the ex-post optimal choice, q max t (t; x). The former e¤ect could, for example, result from taxation whereas the latter e¤ect could result from limiting or forcing choice. By taking over part of the individual's decision the government liberates the individual from partly blaming himself. If governmental intervention overall reduces the maximum level of wealth the individual could have obtained, then it reduces the pain associated with regret and thereby increases individual welfare. Second, there is a potential e¤ect through the interaction between the realized level of wealth, W (q; t; x), and the level of wealth derived from the foregone best alternative, W (q max (t;x) ; t; x). Governmental intervention might, for example, reallocate the di¤erences between those two wealth levels across di¤erent states of nature. Depending on preferences this might increase or reduce individual welfare.
In the two sections below, we examine two speci…c governmental policies, tax deduction for uninsured losses and mandatory return guarantees in private retirement accounts, and focus on the trade-o¤ between the two e¤ects, distorting decisions and reducing regret. For both policies, we specify the condition under which governmental intervention can be justi…ed.
Income Tax Deduction for Losses
The Department of Treasury of the United States allows individuals to deduct some of their uninsured losses from their taxable income, such as casualty losses due to natural catastrophes (e.g., after Hurricane Katrina), theft losses, or medical and dental expenses. Kaplow (1992) argues that this type of tax deduction for individuals'net losses serves as partial insurance and distorts insurance decisions in the private insurance market. Since tax deductions only apply to the uninsured portion of losses Kaplow (1992) shows that such tax deductions are welfare decreasing. It has been recently argued that a tax deduction system can improve welfare if the private insurance market is restricted to o¤er upper-limit policies (Huang and Tzeng, 2007a), or if insurance companies can become insolvent (Huang and Tzeng, 2007b) . The aim of this section is to argue that tax deductions of net losses can improve welfare by reducing individual's pain associated with the feeling of regret. We show that this reduction in regret can outweigh the negative e¤ect of tax deduction through distorting individuals'insurance decision.
We adopt the setup of Kaplow (1992) in which the individual is endowed with some initial wealth w 0 and with probability faces a loss of size l < w 0 , i.e.,x 2 f0; lg with associated probabilities 1 and , respectively. The sequence of events is as follows.
Time 0 The government sets a tax deduction rate 0 t < 1 (1 + ) at which the individual is allowed to deduct the non-insured portion of the loss. 7 The expected revenue loss is …nanced by a lump-sum tax .
Time 1
The individual chooses the amount of insurance coverage q 2 [0; l] in a private insurance market at a premium P = (1 + ) q, where 0 is the loading factor proportional to the expected insurance payment.
For comparison, we assume a proportional loading factor for the lump-sum tax that is identical to the one in the private insurance market. 8 The self-…nancing lump-sum tax is thus given by = (1 + ) (l q (t)) t where q (t) is optimal amount of insurance coverage purchased in the private market given a tax deduction rate t. The …nal levels of wealth in the two states are thus W (q; t;x) = 8 > < > :
First, we reestablish the result of Kaplow (1992) for individuals who are not sensitive to regret. Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The ine¢ ciency results from the imposition of insurance coverage for non-insured losses through the tax deduction system which induces individuals to overall purchase less insurance than they would optimally do without the tax deduction.
We now consider the e¤ect of an imposed tax deduction scheme on individuals who are sensitive to the feeling of regret. Since the government determines the tax deduction rate t and the lumpsum tax , the individual only regrets towards his choice q at time 1. After the state variable has realized, he regrets that he did not choose the foregone best alternative q max (t;x), as de…ned in equation (6), which is state-wise given by 9 q max (t;x) =
> < > :
arg max
The individual would have chosen full or no insurance coverage had he known that a loss realizes or not, respectively. Note that both choices, q max (t;x = l) and q max (t;x = 0), do not depend on the tax deduction rate t, i.e., q max (t;x) = q max (x). In reference to (5), there is no e¤ect of governmental intervention on the ex-post optimal choice. However, there is a direct e¤ect on the reference level of wealth towards which the individual regrets since W (q max (x) ; t;x) = 8 > < > :
Governmental intervention thus reduces the reference level of wealth towards which the individual regrets, in this case state-wise by the lump-sum tax , which bene…ts regret sensitive individuals.
Intuitively, since individuals are forced to …nance the implicit insurance provided by the governmental policy, they feel no regret for being mandated such insurance and having to pay for it. In addition, this reduction in the counterfactual level of wealth causes a "cross-e¤ect"on the marginal 9 Note that the individual has paid the lump-sum tax at time 0 before he made his choice q at time 1. utility of realized wealth. Last, governmental intervention distorts insurance decisions in the private insurance market. In the following proposition, we provide a condition under which governmental intervention is overall bene…cial.
Proposition 2 It is optimal for the government to implement a tax deduction scheme, that is,
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This proposition shows that it is optimal for the government to partially impose an implicit insurance scheme through a tax deduction system if individuals are sensitive to the feeling of regret and if U 12 > 0. The bene…t in terms of the reduction in regret is derived from the fact that the lump-sum tax state-wise reduces the level of wealth towards which the individual regrets. If Individuals thus prefer higher levels of wealth realizations being "matched" with higher levels of wealth that they could have obtained from the foregone best alternative. Put di¤erently, individuals favor di¤erences between the realized levels of wealth and the maximum levels of wealth towards which the individual regrets being evenly distributed between di¤erent states of nature. That is, they prefer experiencing a similar degree of regret across all states of nature to experiencing little or no regret in some states while a strong degree of regret in other states.
The condition U 12 > 0 also proves to be crucial for determining the impact of regret on decision making under uncertainty. It induces individuals to "hedge their bets" by avoiding extreme decisions such as the choice of full or no insurance coverage (Braun and Muermann, 2004) . Moreover, 1 0 In the speci…cation of Bell (1982) ,
, the condition U12 > 0 is equivalent to the concavity of the function g. 
Return Guarantees in Private Retirement Accounts
In this section, we examine the e¤ect of governmental intervention on investment decisions in private retirement accounts. In many countries governments react to demographic changes by introducing a funded de…ned contribution (DC) plan. This private account system is either a supplement, substitute, or replacement of the unfunded pay-as-you-go de…ned bene…t (DB) system. Under DC plans participants face their own investment choice and bear investment risk. With the reasoning of partially protecting DC participants from market downturns, some governments have mandated investment guarantees of various forms. Germany and Japan, for example, mandated a principal guarantee such that all contributions are guaranteed in nominal terms. In Chile and Mexico a minimum pension payment of about 25% and 40%, respectively, of average wages is guaranteed. In the US there is a huge debate about reforming the Social Security system including the introduction of private retirement accounts (Cogan and Mitchell, 2003) . One controversial issue in this debate is the provision of investment guarantees including proposals that suggest guaranteeing a real rate of return. Whereas investment guarantees would protect DC participants from investment risk they are costly. Moreover, guarantees induce an incentive problem since they provide DC participants with the incentive to increase their investment risk and thereby the cost of the guarantee (Bodie and Merton, 1993; Smetters, 2002) . Some governments, e.g., Chile and Mexico, have recognized this distortionary e¤ect and responded by restricting the investment choice of DC participants.
For regret-sensitive individuals, a governmentally imposed guarantee, or for that matter a governmentally mandated portfolio restriction, reduces the feeling of blaming oneself for his own investment choice and is therefore bene…cial. We trade this bene…t o¤ against the distortionary e¤ect on investment choice mentioned above and determine the conditions under which a governmentally imposed guarantee increases individual welfare.
For this purpose, we specify the following simple model. The individual has initial wealth w 0 and can invest in two assets, a risk-free asset and a risky asset. We assume that the return of the risk-free asset is normalized to 0 and the return of the risky asset isx 2 fx ; x + g with 1 x < 0 < x + and probabilities forx = x + and (1 ) forx = x . Furthermore, we assume that the expected return of the risky assets is strictly positive, that is,
Since the …nancial market is complete, each payo¤ pro…le and therefore each return guarantee can be replicated by the individual. In the following, we …rst show that a return guarantee which is self-constructed by the individual or which he individually chooses has no impact on individual's welfare.
We consider the following sequence of events.
Time 0 The government mandates a return guarantee x t < 0 in case the realized return of the risky asset isx = x . The return guarantee is …nanced by the no-arbitrage price
q.
Time 1
The individual decides the dollar amount q 2 [0; w 0 ] he invests in the risky asset.
The …nal levels of wealth in the two states are W (q; t;x) = 8 > < > :
For regret insensitive individuals, we derive the following result.
Proposition 3 A governmentally imposed return guarantee cannot improve individual's welfare if
Moreover, under decreasing absolute risk aversion, individual welfare is strictly decreasing in the level of the return guarantee.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
A return guarantee which is imposed by the government distorts the individual investment decision and thereby reduces individual welfare. The government essentially creates an incentive problem since the imposed return guarantee induces individuals to choose a riskier portfolio (Bodie and Merton, 1993; Smetters, 2002) . This result resembles the insight of Kaplow (1992) that tax deduction of non-insured losses distorts the decision in the private insurance market.
We now consider regret sensitive individuals. Ex post, after the state variable has realized, the foregone best alternative q max (t;x), as de…ned in equation (1), is state-wise given by q max (t;x) = 8 > < > :
It would have been optimal to either invest all remaining wealth, w 0 , or nothing into the risky asset had the individual known that the return of the asset was positive or negative, respectively.
Note that q max (t;x) does not depend on t and thus q max (t;x) = q max (x). The levels of wealth towards which the individual regrets are then
We observe again that governmental intervention state-wise reduces the reference level towards which the investor regrets. We now derive the following result.
Proposition 4
It is optimal for the government to impose a return guarantee, that is, t > x , if U 2 < 0 and U 12 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Analogously to a tax deduction system for non-insured losses, the governmental imposition of a return guarantee reduces the pain derived from regret and thereby improves individual welfare.
Under the equivalent condition U 12 > 0, this e¤ect together with the associated state-wise reduction in marginal utility of realized wealth outweigh the distortionary e¤ect on individual welfare for some return guarantee level. For this welfare improvement it is important that the government imposes the return guarantee. Otherwise the individual would regret having chosen a return guarantee and welfare could not be improved.
Conclusion
Governmental intervention in markets shifts individual choices in private markets. Since this optimization problem includes the incentive compatibility constraint, the implied individual welfare can never be strictly higher compared to a system without a tax deduction scheme. The …rst order condition for the constraint (A:2) at time 1 is given by
We note that
and thus q (t) < l for all t > 0. The …rst derivative of expected utility at time 0 is
Substitution of the …rst order condition (A:3) at time 1 yields
We show that l q (t) + q 0 (t) (1 t) < 0 for all 0 t < 1 (1 + ) . Implicitly di¤erentiating the …rst order condition (A:3) with respect to t yields
and thus l q (t) + q 0 (t) (1 t) = (1 t) U 0 (W (q (t) ; t; l)) + (1 + ) (l q (t)) ((1 ) (1 + ) U 00 (W (q (t) ; t; 0)) (1 t (1 + ) ) U 00 (W (q (t) ; t; l)))
(1 ) (1 + ) 2 U 00 (W (q (t) ; t; 0)) + (1 t (1 + ) ) 2 U 00 (W (q (t) ; t; l))
Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies
(1 ) (1 + ) U 00 (W (q (t) ; t; 0)) (1 t (1 + ) ) U 00 (W (q (t) ; t; l)) > 0 for all 0 t < 1 (1 + ) 11 and thus l q (t) + q 0 (t) (1 t) < 0 for all 0 t < 1 (1 + ) . Equation (A:4) thus implies that dE[U (W (q (t);t;x))] dt = 0 for t = 0 and dE[U (W (q (t);t;x))] dt < 0 for 0 < t < 1 (1 + ) .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For convenience, let us introduce the following notation.
and lump-sum tax = (1 + ) (l q) t paid at time 0 and premium P = (1 + ) q paid at time 1.
At time 1, for a …xed tax rate t, the derivative of expected utility with respect to q is given by dEU (q; t) dq = (1 t (1 + ) ) U 1 (W (q; t; l) ; W (q max (l) ; t; l))
(1 ) (1 + ) U 1 (W (q; t; 0) ; W (q max (0) ; t; 0)) .
Evaluating this derivative at q = l yields
Since W (l; t; l) = W (l; t; 0), W (q max (l) ; t; l) < W (q max (0) ; t; 0), and U 12 > 0, we derive dEU (q;t) dq j q=l < 0 and thus q (t) < l for all t 0. The inner solution q (t) to the constraint (3) thus satis…es the …rst order condition dEU (q; t) dq q=q (t) = (1 t (1 + ) ) U 1 (W (q (t) ; t; l) ; W (q max (l) ; t; l)) (A.5)
(1 ) (1 + ) U 1 (W (q (t) ; t; 0) ; W (q max (0) ; t; 0)) = 0. and the …rst order condition (A:3).
At time 0, the derivative of expected utility with respect to t is then given by
(1 ) (1 + ) l q (t) + q 0 (t) (1 t) U 1 (W (q (t) ; t; 0) ; W (q max (0) ; t; 0)) (1 + ) (l q (t)) q 0 (t) t U 2 (W (q (t) ; t; l) ; W (q max (l) ; t; l))
Substitution of the …rst order condition (A:5) yields dEU (q (t) ; t) dt = l q (t) + q 0 (t) (1 t) tU 1 (W (q (t) ; t; l) ; W (q max (l) ; t; l))
Evaluating this derivative at t = 0 implies
Since U 2 < 0 and q (0) < l, we have dEU (q (t);t) dt j t=0 > 0 and thus t > 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. Individual welfare under a governmentally imposed return guarantee is given by
The …rst order condition for the constraint (A:7) at time 1 is given by
and thus q (t) > 0 for all x t < 0. The …rst order condition at time 0 is
Substitution of the …rst order condition (A:8) at time 1 yields
We show that q (t) (x + t) q 0 (t) < 0 for all x t < 0. Implicitly di¤erentiating the …rst order condition (A:8) with respect to t yields q 0 (t) = (1 ) (U 0 (w 0 + q (t) t) + tq (t) U 00 (w 0 + q (t) t)) (x + ) 2 U 00 (w 0 + q (t) x + ) + (1 ) t 2 U 00 (w 0 + q (t) t) and thus q (t) x + t q 0 (t) = q (t) x + ( x + U 00 (w 0 + q (t) x + ) + (1 ) tU 00 (w 0 + q (t) t)) + (x + t) (1 ) U 0 (w 0 + q (t) t) (x + ) 2 U 00 (w 0 + q (t) x + ) + (1 ) t 2 U 00 (w 0 + q (t) t)
Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies x + U 00 w 0 + q (t) x + + (1 ) tU 00 (w 0 + q (t) t) > 0
for all x t < 0 12 and thus q (t) (x + t) q 0 (t) < 0 for all x t < 0. Equation (A:9) thus implies that dE[U (W (q (t);t;x))] dt = 0 for t = x and dE[U (W (q (t);t;x))] dt < 0 for x < t < 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows analogously the proof of Proposition 2. In this setting we have EU (q; t) = E [U (W (q; t;x) ; W (q max (x) ; t;x))] q paid at time 0. At time 1, for a …xed return guarantee t, the derivative of expected utility with respect to q is given by dEU (q; t) dq = and the …rst order condition (A:8).
Evaluating this derivative at q = 0 yields dEU (q; t) dq j q=0 = Since U 12 > 0, W (0; t; x + ) = W (0; t; x ), and W (q max (x + ) ; t; x + ) > W (q max (x ) ; t; x ), we have U 1 (W (0; t; x + ) ; W (q max (x + ) ; t; x + )) > U 1 (W (0; t; x ) ; W (q max (x ) ; t; x )) and thus dEU (q; t) dq j q=0 > x + + (1 ) t U 1 W 0; t; x ; W q max x ; t; x > 0 for all t x . Therefore q (t) > 0 for all t x . The inner solution q (t) to the constraint (3) thus satis…es the …rst order condition dEU (q; t) dq q=q (t) = Evaluating this derivative at t = x implies dEU (q (t) ; t) dt j t=x = x + x + x q x (1 + x + ) U 2 (W (q (x ) ; x ; x + ) ; W (q max (x + ) ; x ; x + )) + (1 ) U 2 (W (q (x ) x ; x ) ; W (q max (x ) ; x ; x )) Since U 2 < 0 and q (x ) > 0, we have dEU (q (t);t) dt j t=x > 0 and thus t > 0.
